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FIRST-TIMERS AND LATE-BLOOMERS:                                     
YOUTH–ADULT UNIONIZATION DIFFERENCES                             
IN A COHORT OF THE U.S. LABOR FORCE
 JONATHAN E. BOOTH, JOHN W. BUDD, AND KRISTEN M. MUNDAY* 
The authors analyze youth–adult unionization differences by using the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to follow a single 
group of individuals from age 15/16 to 40/41. They find that the differences 
between youth and adults are greatest at ages 15 to 17 and largely disappear 
by age 23. Though currently unionized workers are most likely to be in 
their forties or fifties, the authors find that younger workers have a greater 
opportunity or are more inclined to be unionized than adults and that many 
individuals report having had a unionized job by the age of 25. The authors also 
find that whereas the stock of unionized workers is largest at middle age, the 
flow of workers into unionized jobs is greatest between the ages of 16 and 25.
Unionization patterns for adult workers are believed to differ significantly from 
those for younger workers. Bryson et al. 
(2005), for example, motivate their study of 
youth–adult differences in unionization by 
showing that unionization rates for workers 
aged 25–65 are three times higher than for 
those aged 15–24 in the United States and 
Canada, and two times higher in Britain. A 
similar pattern is evident in New Zealand 
and other countries (Haynes, Vowles, and 
Boxall 2005). Consequently, a number 
of studies specifically examine younger 
workers’ attitudes towards unions (e.g., 
Blanden and Machin 2003; Freeman and 
Diamond 2003; Gallagher 1999; Gomez, 
Gunderson, and Meltz 2002; Lowe and 
Rastin 2000; Spilsbury et al. 1987).
In comparing youths with adult workers, 
however, most studies analyze across 
rather than within cohorts. The statistics 
just noted from Bryson et al. (2005), for 
example, compare the unionization rates 
for youths and adults for 1990, 1995, 
and 2000. Cross-sectional comparisons, 
however, cannot separate life-cycle effects 
from cohort effects (Clark 2007). Unlike 
those studies, ours asks whether 40-year-
olds were more likely than 20-year-olds to 
be represented by unions in 2005 because 
of their age, or because of characteristics, 
attitudes, and experiences specific to the 
cohort of workers who entered the labor 
force beginning in the 1980s that can be 
different from the characteristics, attitudes, 
and experiences of those who entered 20 
years later. Blanchflower (2007) specifically 
raised this question and found that the 
inverted-U age–unionization profiles for 
both the United States and Britain are 
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significantly flatter when controlling for 
cohort effects. In this paper, we investigate 
this issue further for the United States by 
tracking a single cohort of individuals in 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79)from age 15 or 16 in 1979 to 
age 40 or 41 in 2004, uncovering important 
results for this literature. 
By tracking individuals from the point 
when they initially enter the labor force, 
we can identify the age at which they first 
become unionized and analyze the relative 
probability of their unionization over the 
first half of their working lives. This focus 
on a single cohort from the beginning 
of their entrance into the labor market 
into middle age is a unique approach 
to analyzing individuals’ unionization 
decisions and generates new results that 
enhance our understanding of youth–
adult differences in unionization across 
the life cycle.1 Furthermore, our results, 
which demonstrate that most workers first 
experience unionization at a much younger 
age, may temper the popular impression 
that unionization is the domain of middle-
aged and older workers. Specifically, for the 
cohort of U.S. individuals who had been 
represented by a union by the time they 
were around 40 years old in 2004, three-
quarters were first represented by age 25. 
The stock of unionized workers is largest 
at middle age, but the flow into unionized 
jobs is largest at younger ages, and this 
flow appears to be related to completing 
one’s education. These results uncover new 
areas of research that can help us better 
understand unionization trends, and they 
have important practical implications for 
how companies and labor unions can devise 
strategies for shaping individuals’ attitudes 
toward unions.
1 Fullagar, McCoy, and Shull (1992), Clark et al. 
(1993), and Fullagar et al. (1994) analyzed the 
socialization of new union members in one union, 
but the experiences analyzed are not necessarily these 
workers’ first unionized jobs. The mean age in the 
sample used in Clark et al. (1993) and Fullagar et al. 
(1994) is 35 years old; it is 25 years old in Fullagar, 
McCoy, and Shull (1992). Our sample starts tracking 
individuals at age 15/16 to identify workers’ first and 
subsequent unionized jobs.
A Life-Cycle                                            
Theory of Individual Unionization
Many industrial relations scholars model 
whether workers are unionized as a function 
of opportunity and propensity (Bain and 
Elsheikh 1976; Spilsbury et al. 1987; Blanden 
and Machin 2003). Though this model was 
initially used as a theoretical foundation 
for studying aggregate unionization trends 
(Bain and Elsheikh 1976) and has more 
recently been applied to union-joining 
decisions in an open shop environment 
(Blanden and Machin 2003), the logic of 
this model can be extended to the issue 
of union coverage in the U.S. context. 
Specifically, we model whether an individual 
holds a unionized job, not whether an 
individual joins a labor union. In the 
United States, workers are “unionized” in a 
meaningful sense when they have jobs that 
are represented by unions and are covered 
by collective bargaining agreements. 
Hence, an individual can be unionized 
without actually being a union member; 
union membership is a separate decision. 
Due to a lack of available data on union 
membership, we concentrate on whether 
workers are unionized, not whether they 
are union members. Moreover, our focus 
here is on the outcome (that is, whether a 
worker has a unionized job or not), not on 
the underlying process of job-seeking, so 
it is not necessary to distinguish between 
those who intentionally choose a unionized 
job and those who obtain a job that happens 
to be unionized. This is consistent with the 
literature on U.S. unionization patterns 
(e.g., Blanchflower 2007).
Consider first a simple model of whether 
an individual i is covered by a union contract 
(or equivalently, represented by a union) at 
age a and time t (Ciat) as a function of the 
worker’s opportunity of being covered (Oi) 
and the worker’s propensity to be covered 
(Pi):
(1)  Ciat = f (Oi , Pi ) + εiat  
where εiat is a random error term that 
captures other factors. Opportunity 
captures the availability of unionized jobs. 
Individuals living in areas where union 
density is higher, such as in urban areas 
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or non-right-to-work states, have more 
opportunities to obtain unionized jobs. 
Likewise, for individuals qualified to work 
in industries and occupations with higher 
levels of union density, the prospects 
for securing unionized jobs are greater. 
Propensity reflects an individual’s desire for 
union representation. Pro-union attitudes 
and union instrumentality positively 
affect propensity (Barling, Kelloway, and 
Bremermann 1991; Blanden and Machin 
2003); perceived costs of being represented 
by a union negatively affect propensity. 
Union coverage, alternatively, can be 
modeled as a function of the supply of and 
demand for unionized jobs (e.g., Farber 
1983), but these terms frequently focus one’s 
attention on utility-maximizing, pecuniary 
factors. We therefore prefer to model 
unionization as a function of opportunity 
and propensity while recognizing that the 
supply of unionized jobs is an important 
aspect of opportunity, and that the demand 
for union representation is an important 
aspect of propensity. 
Equation (1) captures a simple age/time-
invariant model of union coverage insofar 
as opportunity and propensity are assumed 
to be fixed for each individual (or each 
cohort). Implicit in the literature on youth–
adult unionization differences, however, is 
a richer life-cycle model of union coverage 
that incorporates age-varying opportunities 
of coverage and propensities to be covered. 
Also, if aggregate economic, legal, and 
political changes affect opportunity or 
propensity, then a richer model also 
includes time-varying components. The life-
cycle model is therefore 
(2)  Ciat = f (Oiat (Lia, Tit  ) Piat  (Lia, Tit  )) + εiat
in which opportunity and propensity are 
functions of sets of life-cycle age-varying 
characteristics (Lia), such as educational 
attainment or changing attitudes towards 
labor unions, and time-varying aggregate 
trends (Tit). 
There are a number of reasons 
to hypothesize that opportunity and 
propensity vary across a worker’s life cycle. 
The opportunity to obtain a unionized 
job—again, either intentionally or 
unintentionally—can vary over time as 
workers relocate across geographical areas 
with differing levels of union density. In 
the 1990s, employment growth was higher 
in right-to-work states where union density 
was lower than in non-right-to-work states 
(Wilson 2002), which might have pulled 
individuals into these areas where the 
chances of having a unionized job were 
lower. A movement across industries and 
occupations by individuals as they age 
can also affect the opportunity to find a 
unionized job over time. To formalize this, 
we borrow a concept from the literature on 
internal labor markets and posit that there 
are ports of entry into unionized sectors 
of the labor market (Kerr 1954; Doeringer 
and Piore 1971). Opportunity can increase 
as workers age if they complete additional 
training or schooling and therefore become 
qualified for unionized jobs. Completing 
an apprenticeship program and earning 
teacher certification are two examples. In 
such cases, ports of entry into unionized 
jobs open up over part of a worker’s 
life cycle. Alternatively, opportunity can 
decrease if work experience leads a worker 
up a career ladder away from traditionally-
unionized jobs; in other words, the ports of 
entry into unionized jobs might close as a 
worker ages. 
Propensity can be hypothesized to vary 
across the life cycle as well. Attitudes toward 
unions can vary across the life cycle as 
the context of work changes, such as the 
costs of quitting, expected job duration, 
and preferences for cash compensation or 
benefits (Gallagher 1999). How workers 
first experience unionization can also 
potentially shape later attitudes towards 
unionization (Lowe and Rastin 2000). 
Bryson and Gomez (2003) and Gomez 
and Gunderson (2004) argued, for 
example, that it is not until an individual is 
a union member that he or she can form 
an accurate opinion about whether the 
benefits of union membership outweigh 
the costs. The complete understanding of 
what being a union member entails is only 
held by those individuals who are union 
members. Grievance procedures, just 
cause protections, and requirements for 
negotiating rather than imposing work rule 
changes are some examples of benefits that 
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union members receive but which might be 
difficult for non-unionized workers to fully 
observe and appreciate. Extending this logic 
to union representation, this “experience 
good” model of unionism predicts that 
an individual who is satisfied with union 
representation would want to be represented 
by a union in the future. Complementary 
research in psychology reveals that new 
union members who participate in formal 
and informal socialization activities will 
exhibit greater levels of union commitment 
(Fullagar, McCoy, and Shull 1992; Clark et al. 
1993; Fullagar et al. 1994). Similarly, workers 
who have what they believe to be a poor 
experience with union representation are 
more likely to avoid union representation in 
future jobs (Prowse and Prowse 2006).
 The contrast between these age/time-
invariant and life-cycle models of union 
coverage guides our empirical analyses. 
The age/time-invariant model predicts that 
cohort effects explain observed differences 
in unionization rates between youths and 
adults. In contrast, youth–adult differences 
that reflect life-cycle changes in work and 
attitudes require a richer model in which 
opportunity and propensity to unionize 
vary over the life cycle. At the same time, 
the life-cycle model reveals the need to 
distinguish between age and time effects. As 
such, the remainder of this paper analyzes 
the empirical support for the two models, 
including what we believe is the first analysis 
of workers’ first experiences with union 
representation, while also trying to separate 
age from time effects. 
Data
To follow a single cohort of employees 
as they enter the labor force through to 
middle age, we use data from the nationally 
representative National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979.2 The NLSY79 
collected longitudinal demographic and 
labor market information from the same set 
2 To correct for intentional over-sampling of 
demographic groups such as minorities and low-income 
households in the NLSY79, the results throughout this 
article are computed using sampling weights. For more 
details on the sampling methods and data elements of 
the NLSY79, see Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005).
of individuals every year from 1979 to 1994, 
and every other year thereafter. All of the 
NLSY79 respondents were between the ages 
of 14 and 22 when first surveyed in 1979, 
but our analyses focus on the select group 
of individuals who were aged 15 or 16 when 
first surveyed.3 This methodology enables 
us to be confident that we are adequately 
capturing the experiences individuals have 
with unionization when they first enter the 
labor force.4 
Each NLSY79 wave includes information 
on up to five jobs for each respondent. We 
examined the individuals in our cohort of 15- 
and 16-year-olds from 1979 to 2004 across all 
five jobs and identified all instances at which 
each reported being covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement on at least one job 
(“unionized”). We then created variables 
for them, indicating for each survey year 
(equivalently, age) whether they are and 
whether they had ever been unionized. 
The first instance of ever being unionized 
captures workers’ first experience with 
unionization, that is, their first unionized 
job. Some waves of the NLSY79 do not 
contain information on union membership, 
so we only analyze unionization as measured 
by collective bargaining coverage. This 
focus on coverage rather than membership 
is common in individual-level research on 
U.S. unionization.
Of the 3,130 individuals in the NLSY79 
aged 15 or 16 in 1979, we eliminated 1,534 
because we were unable to fully track their 
3 Some waves of the NLSY79 occur in different 
months, so not everyone ages exactly one year in the 
reported data. We recode everyone to age one year for 
each survey year based on their age in the initial 1979 
survey.
4 Because parts of our analyses rely on identifying an 
individual’s first unionized experience, we cannot be 
confident that we adequately capture this information 
for those individuals that begin the survey between the 
ages of 17 and 22. The unionization rate for 15-year-
olds in 1979 is less than 2 percent, compared to a 
rate of between 5 and 10 percent for 17- and 18-year-
olds. This increase demonstrates that the possibility 
of missing pre-survey unionization is nontrivial for 
those over the age of 16. Additionally, we exclude 
14-year-olds because they represent a smaller group 
in comparison to 15- and 16 year-olds (the number 
of individuals in each group is 948, 1,566, and 1,564 
respectively). Limiting the sample to 15 and 16 year-
olds enables us to maintain balanced cohort sizes.
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unionized status over time due to a lack of 
participation in one or more of the 21 waves 
of the survey. Missing values further reduced 
the final sample size to 1,507 individuals for 
whom unionization status can be followed 
from age 15 or 16 to age 40 or 41.5 To create 
a consistent series, individuals were retained 
in the sample when they were not working. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 
demographic, labor market, and job history 
variables used in the analyses. Only the first 
and last waves are summarized in Table 
1, but for all 1,507 individuals we have 21 
waves of data spanning 26 years. 
The Cohort Effect in                              
Youth–Adult Unionization Differences
Youth–adult differences in unionization 
are frequently analyzed using cross-
sectional data samples, which do not allow 
for the identification of a cohort-specific 
effect. Using our sample from the NLSY79, 
however, we can trace the unionization rate 
for one cohort of individuals as they age from 
15/16 to 40/41. The resulting age profile of 
the fraction covered by a union contract is 
indicated by the dashed line in Figure 1.6 
5 To maintain a decent sample size, we imputed 
values for variables where there were missing values 
and where we felt confident we could make the 
imputations. However, 84 individuals were excluded 
because missing information existed for which no 
value could be determined; five others were excluded 
because their starting wage value was less than one 
dollar. The largest set of imputations were made for 
a survey error that occurred in 1994, which caused 
621 employed individuals in our final sample to 
not be asked whether or not they were covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement on the job. We utilized 
information reported for other variables to fill in the 
missing information—89 of these individuals reported 
being self-employed and were thus coded as not 
covered, another 487 were able to be matched based 
on their employer identification code to a previous or 
subsequent year in which the value for their covered 
status provided in that year was utilized, 26 individuals 
were matched in a similar fashion using industry and 
occupation codes, and 19 individuals were coded as not 
covered because of job tenure of a month or less.
6 We exclude the ages of 15 and 41 from our figures 
because we are only able to observe half our sample 
for these ages. The age of 15 is only observable for the 
cohort that began the NLSY79 at age 15. Likewise, the 
age of 41 is only observable for the cohort that began 
the survey at the age of 16. Additionally, because the 
survey is only given every other year after 1994, each age 
between 31 and 41 alternates between the 15-year-old 
This profile reveals a steady increase in the 
coverage rate during the teen years and early 
20s, and then a relatively flat profile for the 
remainder of the sample period up to age 
40. As column 1 of Table 2 illustrates, the 
average coverage rate for age 15–17 is only 
23 percent of the level of the coverage rate 
for these same individuals when they are 20 
years older (that is, 3.7 percent compared 
to 16.2 percent), but this difference is short-
lived and largely disappears by the time the 
individuals are 23 years old.  
To explore these differences more 
formally, we pooled the 1,507 individuals 
across the 21 survey waves and estimated 
probit models on these 31,647 observations 
with the dependent variable defined as an 
indicator for whether the individuals were 
unionized at a specific age. The probit 
results reported in column 2 of Table 2 
do not include any control variables and 
show that the average (raw) unionization 
rate for the two youngest age groups are 
indeed statistically different from the oldest 
age group. The union density trend for our 
single cohort of individuals, then, uncovers 
a significant youth–adult unionization 
difference, but compared to the cross-
sectional results from Bryson et al. (2005), 
in which the unionization rate for workers 
aged 15–24 is only one-third as high as the 
unionization rate for those aged 25–65 in 
the United States, the age-profile in the 
single NLSY79 cohort flattens out more 
quickly. Our results are consistent with 
Blanchflower’s (2007) results that also used 
narrower age categories distinguishing 
between teenagers and those in their early 
20s.7 
Column 3 of Table 2 presents the results 
and 16-year-old cohorts. To construct the figures, we 
therefore calculated the unionization rates of interest 
for each age within each cohort, replaced each missing 
value with the average of the previous and subsequent 
values within each cohort, and then calculated the 
weighted average of the two rates for each age.
7 To maintain a balanced panel, the results in 
Table 2 include all individuals, not just those who 
are employed. Excluding those who are not working 
increases the average union coverage rate by around 
1.8 percentage points in a fairly uniform fashion across 
the age categories. Consequently, the youth–adult 
unionization differences among the employed are 
quite similar to those reported in Table 2.
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a The table contains weighted sample means and standard deviations for the years 1979 and 2004. All job 
variables reflect the value reported for the job that the individual held as a “current or most recent job.”
b Hours worked includes only those individuals that reported being employed in that year. This reduces the 
number of usable observations to 434 in 1979 and 1,328 in 2004.
c The hourly wages variable excludes individuals who are not working and also individuals reporting a value 
less than $1 or greater than $200. This reduces the number of usable observations to 429 in 1979 and 1,277 
in 2004.
Source: NLSY79 data for 1979--2004 of individuals who were 15 or 16 years old in 1979. 
Table 1. Selected Summary Statistics for NLSY79 1979/2004a 
 1979 
(1) 
2004 
(2) 
Covered by a Union Contract (Unionized)  0.019 
(0.120) 
0.149 
(0.373) 
Ever Unionized 0.019 
(0.120) 
0.644 
(0.474) 
Age 15.495 
(0.500) 
40.495 
(0.500) 
Female 
 
0.492 
(0.498) 
0.492 
(0.498) 
Nonwhite 
 
0.290 
(0.500) 
0.290 
(0.500) 
Married 
 
0.008 
(0.096) 
0.651 
(0.492) 
Highest Education: High School Not Complete 1.000 
(0.000) 
0.065 
(0.267) 
Highest Education: High School Graduate  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.419 
(0.496) 
Highest Education: Some College  
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.222 
(0.427) 
Highest Education: College Graduate  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.293 
(0.433) 
Lived in an Urban Area 0.755 
(0.424) 
0.684 
(0.446) 
Lived in a Right-to-Work State 0.269 
(0.456) 
0.385 
(0.496) 
Local Unemployment Rate  6.263 
(2.013) 
5.663 
(1.500) 
Number of Prior Jobs 0.165 
(0.484) 
10.967 
(6.174) 
Worked in Professional and Related Services 0.025 
(0.159) 
0.230 
(0.432) 
Worked in Manufacturing 0.033 
(0.151) 
0.124 
(0.320) 
Worked in Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.127 
(0.316) 
0.147 
(0.344) 
Worked in a Blue-Collar Job 0.073 
(0.236) 
0.208 
(0.410) 
Worked in the Public Sector 0.012 
(0.130) 
0.137 
(0.365) 
Average Hours Worked per  
Weekb 
15.417 
(11.400) 
40.126 
(11.208) 
Hourly Wages (2004 dollars)c 6.705 
(8.126) 
20.544 
(15.996) 
Sample Size 1,507 1,507 
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of a further analysis of these youth–adult 
differences. This model adds demographic 
controls to the simple probit model from 
column 2 and therefore accounts for the 
changing marital status, educational levels, 
and geographical locations of individuals as 
they age. These changes explain a portion of 
the difference in unionization between the 
youngest and oldest ages (compare –0.096 
to –0.114 for the age 15–19 coefficient), 
but the overall profile remains similar. 
The addition of variables that capture the 
changing industry, occupation, and hours 
of work for individuals’ jobs as they age 
(column 4) further reduces the unionization 
differences between teenagers and those 
aged 35–41 years old. 
As noted in the model in equation (2), 
however, aggregate trends can also be 
important determinants of unionization 
rates. The NLSY79 cohort studied here ages 
from 15/16 to 40/41, from 1979 to 2004. 
This time period includes three recessions 
(early 1980s, early 1990s, and early 2000s) 
and a 50-percent decline in overall union 
density from 27 percent to less than 14 
percent (Hirsch and Macpherson 2008). As 
a result, the workers in this cohort might 
have fewer opportunities for unionized jobs 
when they are older, and the youth–adult 
differences estimated in column 4 of Table 
2 might be misleadingly small. The probit 
model in column 5, therefore, includes the 
local unemployment rate, the annual growth 
in real GDP, and the state unionization 
rate.8 As expected, when we account for 
reduced unionization opportunities at 
older ages, the youth–adult unionization 
gap widens. The differences between 
columns 4 and 5 are modest, however, and 
even with the inclusion of the controls for 
aggregate trends, youth–adult unionization 
differences mostly disappear by age 23. 
Finally, column 6 of Table 2 reports the 
results of a random effects probit model 
that controls for an individual-specific 
8 State-level unionization rates are from Hirsch, 
Macpherson, and Vroman (2001), as updated by those 
authors on www.unionstats.com. To further control 
for state-level economic conditions, we also estimated 
a model that included state-level probabilities of a 
recession graciously provided by James Hamilton, but 
these did not change the results.
effect, such as unchanging attitudes toward 
unionization, in addition to the controls for 
demographic, job, and aggregate trends. 
The predicted unionization difference 
between the youngest and oldest age 
groups is estimated to be –0.025, and –0.015 
between 18–22 year-olds and 35–41 year-
olds. Just as it is in the other specifications, 
the differences among those who are 
between 23 and 41 years old are slight. 
It should be noted that the break 
point between 22- and 23-year-olds is 
not an artifact of our categorizations. 
We explored alternative specifications 
of the age categories, and the categories 
displayed in Table 2 seem to best reflect 
the unionization differences in the data. 
For example, changing the endpoint of the 
18–22 year-old category to 23 weakens the 
magnitude of this coefficient while leaving 
the next older category unchanged in each 
of the specifications in Table 2.9 
The results reported in Table 2 imply 
that though a cohort effect cannot fully 
explain the youth–adult unionization 
differences previously uncovered in cross-
sectional analyses, a combination of 
person-specific heterogeneity, aggregate 
trends, and demographic and especially 
job-related changes over the life cycle can 
explain approximately 65–75 percent of 
these youth–adult differences (compare 
columns 2 and 6). Moreover, these results 
demonstrate that youth–adult differences 
in unionization are strongest for the very 
youngest workers (up to age 17), and largely 
disappear by age 23. These findings are 
important because the previous literature 
has tended to group all youths together 
(e.g., Bryson et al. 2005; Gomez, Gunderson, 
and Meltz 2002), and, in some cases, to use 
an age cut-off for youths of 30 years old 
(Freeman and Diamond 2003; Haynes, 
Vowles, and Boxall 2005). We can now 
see that both approaches mask important 
aspects of youth–adult differences in U.S. 
union coverage rates. 
Youth–adult Differences in Unionized Jobs
9 Using dummy variables for each age yields similar 
results. Lastly, a simple switching probit model 
analogous to Quandt’s (1958) regression switching 
model indicates a breakpoint around 22-23 years old.
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The 1,507 individuals in our sample 
began 599 unionized jobs between the 
ages of 15 and 22 and began 223 unionized 
jobs between the ages of 35 and 41. Table 
3 compares the characteristics of these 
jobs, excluding those with missing values. 
These summary statistics complement 
what we have uncovered about youth–
adult differences in unionization rates by 
revealing how the nature of unionization 
changes over workers’ life cycles. Unionized 
jobs held by younger workers are more likely 
to be held by males, whereas unionized 
jobs among adults are gender neutral (the 
fraction female in column 2 mimics the 
overall sample fraction of 0.492). More than 
half of the early unionized jobs occur before 
workers complete their education, while 
this is rarely the case for later unionized 
jobs. Moreover, 71.8 percent of the early 
unionized jobs are these workers’ first 
unionized jobs, compared to only 26 percent 
of the later ones. These last two comparisons 
are unsurprising, but it is useful to document 
the magnitude of the differences. These 
contrasts are vivid reminders that youths 
and adults experience unionization in very 
different ways. 
Younger workers are less likely to 
hold unionized jobs in manufacturing, 
transportation, communication, public 
utilities, and professional services; rather, 
they are much more likely to experience 
unionization in the wholesale and retail 
trades, and to a lesser extent, in non-
professional services. Younger workers’ 
unionized jobs are also significantly more 
likely to be in blue collar, clerical, and 
service occupations. A significantly higher 
fraction of older workers’ unionized jobs 
are in professional occupations and in the 
public sector. Though these differences are 
predictable, they have been overlooked in 
the literature on youth–adult unionization 
differences. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to observe attitudinal measures such as job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, 
satisfaction with the union, or union 
commitment.10 A valuable subject for future 
10 While the NLSY79 contains a measure of job 
satisfaction, it is not consistently asked for all jobs until 
1994, which means that it is unavailable for many of the 
research is whether the differences in how 
youths and adults experience unionism 
affect these attitudes, and in turn how they 
affect future labor market outcomes.
The Age/Ever-Unionized                        
Profile Over the Life-Cycle
Tracking a single cohort of individuals 
from when they first enter the labor market 
until age 40/41 allows us to examine a 
previously overlooked issue in the literature 
on youth–adult unionization differences: 
the point at which workers experience 
unionization for the first time in their 
working lives. To this end, we calculate, on 
an age-by-age basis, the aggregate fraction 
of the individuals in our sample who are 
or were covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement and were therefore represented 
by a labor union. The resulting series reveals 
the likelihood of having experienced 
unionization by a specific age. This age/
ever-unionized profile for ages 16 to 40 is 
shown by the solid line in Figure 1. The 
nonlinear shape of the age/ever-unionized 
profile underscores the life-cycle dynamics 
of unionization, and Figure 1 clearly reveals 
that workers first experience unionization 
largely when they are young.11 More than 
one-third (35.3 percent) of the sample had 
at least one unionized job by age 22, and 
nearly half (49.3 percent) experienced 
unionization by age 25. Among those who 
were unionized by age 40, 76.5 percent first 
experienced unionization by age 25.
The flattening of the age/ever-unionized 
profile after age 35 in Figure 1 further 
suggests that if a worker has not been 
represented by a union by age 40, it is 
very unlikely that the worker will ever be 
unionized. To investigate this further, we 
estimated a three-parameter exponential 
model of the form ever-unionized = β0+ β1* 
β2
age on the data plotted in Figure 1 using 
nonlinear least squares. The resulting 
model has an adjusted R2 value of 0.996, and 
unionized jobs analyzed here.
11 Figure 1 also shows that 64 percent of the 
individuals in this cohort are unionized at least once 
in their working lives by age 40. Across the life cycle, 
then, U.S. labor unions represent many more workers 
than is suggested by the conventional union density 
statistic of less than 15 percent. 
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Continued
  Ages 15-22 
(1) 
Ages 35-41 
(2) 
Age 19.278 
(1.820) 
37.586** 
(1.866) 
Female 
 
0.390 
(0.496) 
0.487** 
(0.497) 
Nonwhite 
 
0.326 
(0.499) 
0.354 
(0.492) 
Married 
 
0.130 
(0.335) 
0.602** 
(0.501) 
High School Not Complete 0.333 
(0.461) 
0.068** 
(0.251) 
High School Graduate  0.463 
(0.500) 
0.454 
(0.497) 
Some College  
 
0.186 
(0.400) 
0.193 
(0.419) 
College Graduate  0.018 
(0.143) 
0.285** 
(0.445) 
Schooling Completed at the Time of the Job 0.415 
(0.497) 
0.968** 
(0.204) 
Lived in an Urban Area 0.832 
(0.357) 
0.754 
(0.399) 
Lived in a Right-to-Work State 0.265 
(0.451) 
0.318** 
(0.489) 
Number of Prior Jobs 3.641 
(2.766) 
13.855** 
(6.306) 
First Unionized Job 0.718 
(0.458) 
0.260** 
(0.422) 
Industry   
Manufacturing 0.195 
(0.387) 
0.143* 
(0.342) 
Transportation, Communication, and Public 
Utilities 
0.052 
(0.223) 
0.125** 
(0.331) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.367 
(0.470) 
0.147** 
(0.337) 
Professional and Related Services 0.108 
(0.352) 
0.361** 
(0.485) 
Other Services (Business, Repair, Personal, 
Entertainment, or Recreation) 
0.106 
(0.313) 
0.037** 
(0.224) 
  
Table 3. Youth–Adult Differences in Unionized Jobs: Summary Statisticsa
all of the parameters are highly significant 
with p-values of less than 0.0001. Using this 
model to predict (out of sample) the ever-
unionized rate at age 65 indicates that no 
more than another 2.5 percent of workers 
are likely to experience unionization for the 
first time between age 40 and 65. In other 
words, of those workers who experience 
unionization between ages 15 and 65, more 
than 96 percent have their first unionized 
job by age 40, and more than 70 percent are 
first unionized by age 25. Late bloomers are 
likely rare in the U.S. labor movement.
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Occupation   
Professional, Technical, and Kindred 0.022 
(0.179) 
0.313** 
(0.452)  
Clerical and Kindred 0.211 
(0.418) 
0.142** 
(0.366)  
Operatives (Not Transport) 0.114 
(0.319) 
0.063** 
(0.251)  
Laborers (Not Farm) 0.185 
(0.370) 
0.074** 
(0.259)  
Service Workers (Including Private 
Household) 
0.248 
(0.435) 
0.109** 
(0.352)  
Public Sector 0.129 
(0.369) 
0.322** 
(0.480)  
Average Hours Worked per  
Week 
33.661 
(12.938) 
38.688** 
(11.051)  
Hourly Wages (2004 dollars)b 9.611 
(4.828) 
18.068** 
(12.534)  
   
Sample Size
 
575 208  
 
 
 
a The table contains weighted sample means and standard deviations for the union ized jobs held by individuals aged 15--22 
and 35-41. Each variable is measured at the start of the job.
b The hourly wages variable excludes individuals with missing values and also individuals reporting a value less than $1 or 
greater than $200. This reduces the number of usable observations to 570 for ages 15-22 and 202 for ages 35-41.
** Statistically different from column 1 at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level.
Source: NLSY79 data for 1979--2004 of individuals who were 15 or 16 years old in 1979.
Table 3. Youth–Adult Differences in Unionized Jobs: Summary Statistics,a Continued
Ages 15--22           Ages 35--41
(1)               (2)
The Openness of                                  
Younger Workers to Unionization
That more than 70 percent are first 
unionized by age 25 implies that younger 
workers are quite open to unionization. 
In fact, Gomez, Gunderson, and Meltz 
(2002) found in survey data for Canada that 
younger workers have a greater preference 
for unionization than do adult workers. 
To explore this further, consider again the 
age/time-invariant and life-cycle models 
of unionization. Specifically, the age/time-
invariant model implies that each worker 
faces a fixed probability of being unionized 
at each age. If this model is accurate, then 
we should be able to generate an age/ever-
unionized profile that matches the actual 
profile in Figure 1 by using simulated data 
and a fixed probability of being unionized. 
Moreover, we can assess youth–adult 
differences in the receptivity to unionization 
by analyzing the extent to which the baseline 
model of a fixed probability of being 
unionized over time needs to be modified 
to fit the actual data. 
We therefore constructed an artificial 
data set of 1,500 individuals spanning ages 
16 to 40, analogous to the actual sample 
used in Figure 1. We randomly determined 
each artificial individual’s union status 
at each age, based on a fixed probability. 
From this, we calculated each individual’s 
age of first unionization and generated 
the aggregate age/ever-unionized profile 
across the 1,500 individuals. We repeated 
this simulation 100 times for the same 
probability level and constructed the 
average age/ever-unionized profile. We also 
repeated this simulation method for each 
fixed probability level from 0.01 to 0.20 in 
0.01 increments. Recall that we are looking 
for a fixed probability level that replicates 
the actual age/ever-unionized profile. 
None of the resulting 20 simulated profiles, 
however, match the actual NLSY79 profile 
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Figure 1. The U.S. Age Profile of Current Union Coverage and 
First Unionized Experience in a Single Cohort
Source: NLSY79 data for 1979--2004 of individuals who were 15 or 16 years old in 1979.
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from Figure 1.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 compare 
the actual profile from Figure 1 and the 
simulated profiles using a 0.05 and 0.06 
probability level of unionization at each age. 
To promote comparison, the 95 percent 
confidence interval for the observed 
NLSY79 profile from Figure 1 is shown 
as dashed lines. The simulated age/ever-
unionized profiles generated from these two 
probability levels come closest to matching 
the actual age/ever-unionized profiles, but 
they lack sufficient curvature to accurately 
replicate the actual profile. Each of the 
other fixed-probability simulations over-
predict or underpredict to a greater extent. 
These results, therefore, do not support an 
age/time-invariant model of unionization.
To replicate the actual NLSY79 profile, 
we need instead to adjust the probability 
of unionization at different age levels 
consistent with a life-cycle model of 
unionization. In Panel (c), we illustrate 
the simulated profile using the actual 
age-by-age union coverage rates from the 
NLSY79 (that is, the dashed line in Figure 
1). This simulation grossly overstates the 
actual pattern of first unionization. So, it 
is clearly not the case that the decision to 
unionize mimics a random draw from the 
pool of unionized and non-union jobs at 
each age. In Panel (d) d of Figure 2, we 
are able to create a simulated profile that 
largely matches the actual NLSY79 profile 
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Source: NLSY79 data for 1979–2004 of individuals who were 15 or 16 years old in 1979. Each simulated profile is 
constructed from 100 simulations of 1,500 individuals facing probability p(U|age) of being unionized at each age 
value.
Figure 2. Comparing Actual and Simulated Age/Ever-Unionized Profiles
by deflating the actual age-by-age coverage 
rates by a factor of two for ages 20–24, a 
factor of five for ages 25–30, and a factor of 
seven for ages 31–40. We stress here that we 
are able to replicate the actual profile only 
by significantly decreasing the probability 
of unionization as workers become older. 
Doing so provides empirical support for a 
life-cycle model of unionization in which 
the combined effects of opportunity and 
propensity decrease as workers age. This is 
an intriguing result since the literature on 
youth–adult differences is often motivated 
by an observation that younger workers 
are less likely to be unionized than older 
workers.
One can question whether these results 
are being driven by measurement error. 
Younger workers, in particular, might 
not pay attention to whether their job is 
unionized or not and might, therefore, not 
accurately report their true union status 
when surveyed. However, under-reporting 
of unionization increases the number of 
workers truly exposed to unionization at 
an early age, and only very high levels of 
over-reporting of union coverage with no 
offsetting under-reporting significantly 
reduces the ever-unionized rate over the 
life cycle (see the Appendix). The age/
ever-unionized profile results therefore 
appear to be robust to reasonable levels of 
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measurement error. The results from Table 
2 further suggest that changing aggregate 
trends are not driving the results; rather, it 
appears that the interaction of opportunity 
and propensity for unionized employment 
declines as workers age.
Youth–adult Flows into Unionized Jobs
The results presented here portray an 
interesting contrast. On the one hand, age-
by-age union coverage rates reinforce what 
other research has found: the probability of 
being unionized increases as workers grow 
from teenagers into adulthood. On the other 
hand, the shape of the age/ever-unionized 
profile suggests that the combined effect 
of opportunity and propensity decreases as 
workers transition from youth to adulthood. 
This contrast indicates that it is important 
to distinguish between the stock and flow of 
unionized workers. Coverage rates reflect 
the stock of unionized workers at a certain 
age whereas the age/ever-unionized profile 
captures the flow of workers into unionized 
jobs for the first time. 
To explicitly analyze the flow into union 
jobs, we identified all instances of new jobs 
reported by the workers in our sample. For 
workers between the ages of 16 and 25, there 
are on average 0.063 new unionized jobs per 
worker per year. For workers between the 
ages of 32 and 41, this average falls to 0.022. 
In other words, the flow into new union jobs 
is three times greater for younger workers 
than it is for adult workers. This result might 
seem obvious—workers are ostensibly more 
likely to move into unionized jobs when they 
are younger because they are more likely to 
move into new jobs generally—but consider 
a comparison between the flow rates into 
unionized and nonunion jobs. Our sample 
suggests that these flow rates are quite 
similar for workers of the same age—the 
flow into new nonunion jobs is also three 
times greater for ages 16–25 compared to 
32–41 (0.636 versus 0.209). In other words, 
the ratio of new union to nonunion jobs is 
relatively stable across these age ranges—
there are 10.2 new nonunion jobs for each 
new unionized job when the individuals 
are aged 16–25, and 9.6 new nonunion 
jobs for each new unionized job when the 
individuals are aged 32–41.
The contrast between the stock and 
flow of unionized workers across the life 
cycle implies that researchers should seek 
to supplement our understanding of the 
youth–adult differences in the stock of 
unionized workers with a greater insight 
into the flow process into unionized jobs 
over the life cycle. Part of this should be 
an understanding of the flow into workers’ 
first unionized jobs. To this end, Figure 3 
presents the age-by-age first unionization 
rates for the sample of 992 individuals, 
for which we identified an instance of 
unionization by age 40/41. Panel (a) shows 
that the highest rates of first unionization 
occur in the age range of 16 to 25 years 
old. First unionization rates for workers 30 
years old and older are significantly lower 
and are always less than three percent. The 
two peaks in Panel (a) coincide with the 
typical age of graduation from high school 
and college, and therefore beg questions 
about the extent to which flows into first 
unionization experiences are related to 
completing one’s education and entering 
the workforce on a full-time basis. 
Panel (b) of Figure 3 addresses this issue 
by presenting the first experience rates for 
the five years prior to the completion of 
schooling and the 10 years after. This figure 
distinguishes between high school dropouts 
and all others and uses each individual’s 
final education level at age 40/41. High 
school dropouts are likely to first experience 
unionization at any time. But for all others, 
the first unionization rate peaks when they 
finish their schooling and remains relatively 
high for a few more years. In other words, 
for those who graduate from high school 
and possibly continue their education 
beyond high school, a significant portion 
of the flows into the unionized sector, 
therefore, appears related to the transition 
from school to the full-time, career-oriented 
labor force. This result suggests a unionized 
sector characterized by ports of entry in 
which schooling is tied to qualifications for 
unionized jobs. 
To analyze this result further, we ask 
whether we can predict when someone 
who is unionized at some point between 
age 15/16 and 40/41 becomes unionized 
for the first time. One can consider 
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Source: NLSY79 data for 1979–2004 of individuals who were 15 or 16 years old in 1979 and who were unionized at some 
point between age 15/15 and 40/41.
Figure 3. The Flow into First Unionized Jobs
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this a duration model: we start tracking 
individuals at age 15/16 and observe how 
many years it takes them to begin their 
first unionized job. Table 4 presents the 
results of estimating the widely-used Cox 
proportional hazards model.12 Consistent 
with Figure 3b, we present separate estimates 
for high school dropouts and non-dropouts. 
In Table 4, hazard ratios above one indicate 
that increases in the relevant independent 
variable are associated with an increased 
likelihood of becoming first unionized 
in the next time period; ratios below one 
indicate the opposite. 
The results for those who have, at a 
minimum, completed high school are 
presented in columns 1–3 of Table 4. For the 
completed schooling variables, the omitted 
reference category consists of the ages when 
individuals are within one year of completing 
their schooling. In all three specifications, 
the completed schooling variables are less 
than one, indicating that individuals are 
most likely to become unionized first around 
the time they complete their schooling. 
When controlling for demographic 
characteristics and aggregate trends 
(column 2), the post-completed schooling 
estimates are not statistically significant, 
and none of the estimates are significant 
when job characteristics are included in the 
model (column 3). These results suggest 
that entering the unionized sector is related 
to completing one’s schooling, but is also 
part of a more complex process related to 
changing job characteristics. Intuitively, 
this seems sensible—individuals complete 
their schooling, enter their careers in new 
industries and occupations, and possibly 
become unionized for the first time. Yet, the 
relationship between beginning full-time 
careers and becoming unionized for the 
first time has not received much attention 
in the literature. As a result, valuable topics 
for future research include analyzing ports 
12 A Cox proportional hazards model estimates the 
parameters β of a hazard function h(t) = h0(t)e
xβ such 
that the independent variables x proportionally shift 
an unspecified baseline hazard h0(t). This is a popular, 
widely-used duration model because it does not 
require constraining the baseline hazard to a specific 
parametric distribution. Table 4 reports hazard ratios 
(the exponentiated coefficients β).
of entry into the unionized sector and 
investigating how they shape youth–adult 
differences in unionization.
The results in columns 4–6 of Table 
4 reinforce the results from Figure 3b in 
portraying a very different situation for 
high school dropouts. Specifically, the 
peak likelihood of becoming unionized 
for the first time occurs 5–7 years after 
dropping out of school. For the most part, 
the estimates in columns 4–6 are quite 
imprecisely estimated, indicating that 
there is little relationship between the time 
when someone drops out of school and 
when one enters the unionized sector. This 
imprecision could also reflect the very small 
sample size; firmer conclusions require 
additional research. 
Conclusions
Youth–adult differences in unionization 
is an important research topic for 
understanding individual unionization 
decisions, labor market and career issues 
over the life cycle, the composition of the 
labor movement, and prospects for the 
labor movement’s future. We have analyzed 
youth–adult differences by tracking a 
single, nationally representative cohort 
of 1,507 individuals in the NLSY79 from 
when they enter the labor market at age 
15/16 until they reach age 40/41. Even 
within a single cohort, there are significant 
differences in unionization rates between 
youths and adults, so a cohort effect cannot 
fully explain the youth–adult unionization 
differences found in cross-sectional analyses 
in the existing research literature. A mixture 
of person-specific heterogeneity, aggregate 
trends, and demographic and job-related 
changes over the first half of workers’ life 
cycles can explain more than three-quarters 
of the raw differential in union coverage 
between those aged 15–17 and 35–41, and 
nearly two-thirds of the difference for those 
aged 18–22. 
More importantly, we find that these 
differences are strongest for the very 
youngest workers (ages 15–17) and largely 
disappear by age 23. Researchers therefore 
need to pay careful attention to the 
definition of youth when examining youth–
adult unionization differences. In their 
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research on youth–adult union membership 
differences in Britain and New Zealand, for 
example, Freeman and Diamond (2003) 
and Haynes, Vowles, and Boxall (2005) use 
age 30 as the dividing line between youths 
and adults. Our results show that in the 
United States this grouping would mask the 
differences between workers who are under 
age 22 and those who are older, and would 
therefore not be appropriate for research 
on U.S. unionization. Even the research that 
groups all youths together up to age 24 (e.g., 
Bryson et al. 2005; Gomez, Gunderson, 
and Meltz 2002) might unintentionally be 
masking important contrasts between the 
younger and older youths. 
By tracking a young cohort of individuals 
for 25 years, we have uncovered additional 
life cycle features of how U.S. workers 
experience unionization. Whereas currently 
unionized workers are likely to be in their 
40s or 50s, individuals’ first unionized jobs 
occur much earlier. In the cohort analyzed 
here, nearly half report having had a 
unionized job by age 25. This translates to 
three-quarters of all individuals who are 
unionized at least once by age 40/41. In 
other words, there are probably few late 
bloomers in the U.S. labor movement. 
Our simulation results further imply that 
the combined effect of opportunity and 
propensity for unionized jobs is lower, not 
higher, among older workers. Even though 
we are cannot directly measure individuals’ 
attitudes towards unions, these results 
implicitly reinforce others’ findings that 
younger workers are not less receptive to 
unions than older workers (Freeman and 
Diamond 2003; Gomez, Gunderson, Meltz 
2002). 
One seemingly sensible hypothesis about 
younger workers’ attitudes toward unions is 
that in high school, everyone ostensibly has 
the opportunity to obtain a unionized job as 
an adult by choosing a career path that leads 
to being a teacher, a nurse, or some other 
highly unionized occupation. But these 
opportunities apparently decline as workers 
age, perhaps because ports of entry into 
unionized jobs are most readily accessible 
when workers complete their schooling and 
begin their full-time careers. Reconciling 
these declining opportunities with the fact 
that union coverage rates are higher among 
older workers requires distinguishing 
between the stock and flow of unionized 
workers. Part of this is a measurement issue: 
older workers have longer job durations, so 
a cross-sectional estimate of union density 
at a point in time will capture a higher 
fraction of unionized workers among older 
rather than younger workers.13 But it might 
be more than a measurement issue: in the 
cohort analyzed here, the flow into both 
union and nonunion jobs among workers 
aged 32–41 is only one-third that of workers 
aged 16–25. So while the stock of unionized 
workers is largest at middle age, the flow 
into unionized jobs is largest at younger 
ages. Future research should investigate 
further how and why the flow of workers 
into and out of unionized employment 
varies over the life cycle. 
Our study of youth–adult differences 
in unionization not only brings to light 
important research issues for understanding 
better how workers experience unionization 
over the life cycle, but it also has significant 
practical implications. Managers in 
nonunion companies use preventive labor 
relations tactics to try to remain “union-
free.” At the same time, union organizers 
use various strategies for recruiting new 
members. In the political arena, business 
groups and labor federations frequently 
vie for the public’s support. Based on an 
aggregate union density rate of less than 
15 percent, all of these strategies might 
frequently be premised on the assumption 
that the targeted individuals have not had 
any direct experience with unionization. 
But our results suggest that a majority of 
individuals are in a unionized job at some 
point in their working lives, and thus, 
strategies to affect workers’ support for or 
against labor unions should be developed 
accordingly.
Moreover, both companies and unions 
should understand that many workers first 
experience unionization at a young age, 
which provides these organizations with the 
opportunity to shape individuals’ attitudes 
13 This is analogous to the fact that a survey of the 
unemployed is more likely to sample individuals with 
longer spells of unemployment (Salant 1977).
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toward unions—attitudes that might persist 
even after they are no longer in unionized 
jobs. Labor unions, for example, should 
guard against creating negative attitudes 
among young workers who might feel 
neglected by their unions because this 
might affect their support for union or 
union-endorsed political causes later on in 
their lives. In other words, unions should 
devise life-cycle rather than membership-
centric models of representation (Kochan 
2005). Our results also suggest that 
lower unionization rates among youths 
as compared to adult workers are largely 
a function of their job characteristics. 
Therefore, unions should not assume that 
youths are unreceptive to unionization 
and should make special efforts to reach 
out to them in their workplaces (Johnson 
and Jarley 2005). Lastly, to the extent that 
workers become unionized as part of the 
process of completing their education, 
unions would benefit from being an 
explicit part of this process. Academics and 
industrial relations practitioners alike, then, 
can benefit from a deeper understanding of 
workers’ experiences with unionization over 
their life cycles.
Appendix: Measurement Error
To investigate measurement error in 
the union coverage variable, the NLSY79 
unionization rates could be compared to 
those in another data source such as the 
Current Population Survey. But the NLSY79 
and these other data sources use similar 
survey methods, so there is little basis 
for assuming that the unionization rates 
reported in other surveys are any more or 
less accurate than the NLSY79. And so we 
take a different approach and ask what the 
true age/ever-unionized profile would look 
like if the observed NLSY79 profile reflected 
a certain level of misclassification of workers’ 
true union status at each age. Simulations 
can answer this question. Specifically, we 
start with the reported union status values 
for each individual at each age in our data 
set and then assume that a percentage of 
individuals over- or under-reported their 
true union status at that age. We then 
simulate the true union status by randomly 
re-coding the relevant percentage of 
individuals and then generate the resulting 
age/ever-unionized profile. Note that we 
do not simulate the age/ever-unionized 
profile directly; we simulate age-by-age 
union coverage status and then derive the 
implied age/ever-unionized profile. 
Appendix Figure A presents the results 
of some of our simulations. As in Figure 2, 
Appendix Figure A includes the NLSY79 
age/ever-unionized profile (with the 95 
percent confidence interval as dashed 
lines) and the average simulated profiles 
from 100 simulations. Note first that with 
many more nonunion than unionized 
workers at any given age, if there are 
symmetrical error rates (that is, roughly 
equal rates of over- and under-reporting) 
then many more workers are misclassified 
as nonunion than as union, so the NLSY79 
age/ever-unionized profile in Figure 1 is 
biased downwards (that is, more individuals 
actually experience unionization earlier 
than suggested in Figure 1). This is 
illustrated in Panel (a) of Appendix Figure 
A in which the simulated “true” profile is 
significantly above the actual profile even 
when we assume that only 5 percent of 
workers coded as nonunion are actually 
working in unionized jobs compared to 20 
percent of reportedly-unionized workers 
erroneously stating that they are unionized 
when they are actually nonunion. 
Panels (b)–(d) in Appendix Figure A 
assume that no workers under-report their 
true union status (that is, all nonunion 
responses are accurate) and vary the rates 
of union over-reporting. In Panel (b), we 
assume that 20 percent of union responses 
are inaccurate at each age, and the resulting 
“true” profile is slightly below the 95 percent 
confidence interval for the profile estimated 
in our data. Panel (c) shows the results of 
what we think is an extreme scenario—50 
percent over-reporting of union status 
(and again, no under-reporting). Even 
in this scenario, the general shape of the 
profile is preserved, 51 percent of workers 
are unionized at least once by age 40, and 
the average age of first unionization is 24 
years. In Panel (d), ignorance is assumed to 
decrease with age with the following over-
reporting rates for union status: 50 percent 
for ages 15–22, 25 percent for ages 23–26, 
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and 15 percent for ages 27 and above. The 
level of the first exposure rates at each age 
is reduced, but the general trajectory of the 
profile is unchanged. Based on these results, 
including other simulations with different 
values for the over-reporting rate that yield 
similar results, we do not believe that the 
shape of the age/ever-union profile is an 
artifact of measurement error.
Appendix Figure A
Age/Ever-Unionized Profiles with Measurement Error
Source: NLSY79 data for 1979--2004 of individuals who were 15 or 16 years old in 1979 and who were 
unionized at some point between age 15/16 and 40/41.
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